Hastings Law Journal
Volume 64 | Issue 5

Article 6

6-2013

Note – The Case for Uniform Hot News
Preemption
Joshua Korr

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Joshua Korr, Note – The Case for Uniform Hot News Preemption, 64 Hastings L.J. 1521 (2013).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol64/iss5/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

Notes
The Case for Uniform Hot News Preemption
Joshua Korr*
Hot news misappropriation is a ninety-year-old tort that provides a quasi-property right
in factual information to fact-gathering organizations. When available, the right prevents
free riders from copying factual information while it remains hot. The question is whether
section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts hot news misappropriation claims in all
circumstances. Although courts have had little trouble finding that most misappropriation
claims are preempted, the issue is complicated in the hot news context by legislative
history suggesting that hot news claims survive preemption. That suggestion conflicts with
the actual language of the Copyright Act’s preemption provision, which seems to require
the universal preemption of hot news claims.
In the 1990s, hot news cases were rare enough that one might have reasonably concluded
that the tort had died out. Nonetheless, courts left open the suggestion that a hypothetical
hot news claim might survive preemption. There the issue might have remained, but
revolutionary technological expansion has made copying, the actus reus of hot news
misappropriation, exponentially more harmful to traditional fact gathering organizations.
In recent years, the hot news tort rose from its dormancy through aggressive litigation by
institutions like the Associated Press and Barclays Capital Inc. Because these lawsuits are
anti-competitive and threaten the public domain, it is time to put the specter of hot news to
rest. Fortunately, faithful application of section 301 of the Copyright Act compels that
exact result. This Note presents the case for uniform hot news preemption.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013, and Executive Notes Editor
of the Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank Professor Margreth Barrett for her insightful
comments, Professor Geoffrey Hazard for his wisdom, Dr. Kenneth Korr for his logic and work ethic,
and Mary Korr, my lifelong editor. Also, a special thank you to the members of the Hastings Law
Journal staff who spend countless hours making each issue of the journal more perfect.
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Introduction
Exponential technological growth has defined the twenty-first
century, especially in the field of information technology. As a result,
factual information is transmitted at ever-increasing speeds to an
increasingly global audience. For example, when a politician makes a
controversial comment, that statement is copied and transmitted to
thousands of websites in a matter of minutes. Rapid factual exchange is
beneficial to society because it encourages cultural dialogue through
public debate, satire, and parody. That benefit has constitutional origins:
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution allows Congress to
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1

grant private property rights to intellectual property. The negative
implication, according to the Supreme Court, is that facts—which are not
2
authored—are not capable of private ownership. On a fundamental
level, our democracy depends on factually driven critical discourse.
Factual property rights are antithetical to that discourse.
While the public benefits from fast and easy access to facts, news
organizations and financial consulting firms have experienced a dramatic
3
decline in profits over the past decade. Both industries pin part of the
blame on news aggregators that republish facts without bearing the cost
4
5
of discovery. While facts themselves are not a depletable resource, fast
and free access to current factual information depletes the value of that
information and impedes fact-gathering organizations from monetizing a
return on their investments. As a result, organizations like the Associated
Press and Barclays Capital have raised “hot news” misappropriation
6
claims to stop news aggregators from free-riding off of their investments.
These organizations contend that if direct competitors can appropriate
content at a fraction of the cost and offer it at a lower price, the “reading
public [will] suffer because no one [will] have an incentive to collect ‘hot
7
news.’”
A hot news claim arises when a defendant copies time-sensitive
factual information from a plaintiff in lieu of discovering those facts
independently. While hot news plaintiffs are primarily concerned with
enjoining defendants from free-riding, monetary damages are also
available. Hot news claims have largely been unsuccessful because courts
have held that they are preempted by section 301 of the 1976 Copyright
8
Act (“Copyright Act”). Courts have preempted hot news claims under
9
an interpretation of § 301 that causes significant policy problems. The
heart of § 301 is the two-prong preemption test contained in § 301(a).
The first prong asks whether the subject matter of the litigation—here

1. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings . . . .”).
2. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
3. See Richard A. Posner, The Future of Newspapers, Becker-Posner Blog (June 23, 2009,
7:37 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com.
4. See id.
5. Unlike physical resources (oil, for example), facts are not a depletable resource. They are
capable of endless consumption. No matter how many people learn the fact that humans have
contributed substantially to changes in the Earth’s climate, countless others may learn that fact. In
contrast, once I burn a gallon of oil, it is depleted.
6. See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
7. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997).
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012).
9. See infra Part III.C.
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“hot” factual information—falls within the scope of the Copyright Act.
The second prong asks whether the cause of action vindicates rights that
11
are “equivalent” to the ones protected by the Copyright Act. In a hot
news case, those rights include the right to control the reproduction of
factual content. Taken together, if a claim seeks to protect the same
subject matter as the Copyright Act with the same rights as the
Copyright Act, it is preempted.
This Note focuses on whether the Copyright Act uniformly
preempts hot news claims. Though no court has explicitly held this, hot
news claims should be uniformly preempted and the doctrine should be
discarded as a potentially viable cause of action because it is inconsistent
with § 301. This issue is relevant in light of the recent Second Circuit
decision, Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc.
12
(“Barclays”), and its relation to the formerly seminal hot news case
13
National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc. (“NBA”). This Note argues
that both cases incorrectly interpret § 301’s second prong.
In NBA, the Second Circuit held that a hot news claim theoretically
survives preemption if it contains “extra elements” that set the claim
14
outside of the general scope of the Copyright Act. Those extra elements
are: “(i) the time-sensitive value of factual information, (ii) the freeriding by a defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence of the
15
product or service provided by the plaintiff.” The NBA three-part test
has come to define the parameters of non-preempted hot news claims in
a majority of the federal circuits. But NBA’s three “extra elements” fail
to save a hot news claim from preemption because those elements do not
vindicate rights that are different from a copyright holder’s exclusive
16
rights. The real question under the second prong of § 301—and the
central question of this Note—is whether a hot news claim ever
vindicates rights that are “qualitatively different” from the ones
17
protected by the Copyright Act.
In Barclays, the Second Circuit revised its approach to hot news
18
19
claims. There, the court characterized NBA’s three-part test as dicta.
But the Barclays court adhered to NBA’s view that an appropriately

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.C.
650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 853
Id.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.B.
650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 899–901.
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narrow hot news claim might survive Copyright Act preemption. For
these reasons, Barclays reached the appropriate result in the case before
it—a finding of preemption—but nonetheless reinforced NBA’s acute
logical flaws.
Even if NBA correctly suggested that hot news claims survive
21
preemption, a viable hot news misappropriation doctrine is bad policy.
First, the doctrine is anticompetitive because it allows large media
corporations to crush small competitors under the weight of litigation.
Second, hot news claims will encroach on the public domain. Third, hot
news claims are minimally useful. Though hot news plaintiffs point to
rapidly dwindling profits and claim that misappropriation will lead to the
end of news gathering, misappropriation has not caused the large-scale
problems of the newspaper industry. The real causes are changing
consumer preferences, dwindling newspaper circulation, the loss of
classified ad and print revenue, the inability of digital revenue to fill the
void, and the loss of the geographical monopolies that insulated local
newspapers for much of the twentieth century.
This Note distills the entire line of hot news cases into a coherent
whole and proposes a framework to guide future courts. Part I outlines the
emergence of the hot news doctrine from its earliest roots in International
News Service v. Associated Press and its subsequent treatment under the
1976 Copyright Act. Part II refutes the NBA court’s conclusion that an
appropriately narrow hot news claim theoretically survives Copyright Act
preemption. Part III discusses the logical problems inherent in the
Barclays decision and argues that a viable hot news cause of action is bad
policy. Part IV concludes that uniformly preempting hot news claims is
consistent with section 301 of the Copyright Act and reflects sound public
policy.

I. The Doctrinal Evolution of Hot News
Misappropriation Claims
The viability of hot news misappropriation claims is best understood
on a bell curve. The doctrine originated in the Supreme Court’s 1918
case International News Service v. Associated Press (“INS”), which also
22
created the broader doctrine of misappropriation. Hot news claims are
a subset of misappropriation claims that specifically concern timesensitive factual content. Although INS’s holding was subsequently
23
nullified by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, INS-like misappropriation

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 898.
See infra Part III.C.
248 U.S. 215 (1918).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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claims rooted in state common law enjoyed substantial growth in the
24
years following INS. Broad use of the doctrine reached its zenith in the
1950s and 1960s because significant gaps in the 1909 Copyright Act left
25
valuable content unprotected. But misappropriation and hot news
entered a period of decline following the passage of the 1976 Copyright
26
Act and its broad preemption provision.
A. The Origin of Hot News: INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE V. ASSOCIATED
PRESS
The INS case arose amid unusual circumstances. During World War
I, William Randolph Hearst—the American owner of the International
27
News Service (“INS”)—publicly sided with Germany. In response,
British and French censors barred INS from sending war dispatches from
28
Europe to the United States. Because INS feared that it would lose
substantial market share to the Associated Press (“AP”) if it did not
cover the war, it systematically re-wrote, and sometimes directly copied,
AP’s war dispatches and sold them to INS-affiliated newspapers while
29
the news was still hot. The Supreme Court decided that it was
30
fundamentally inequitable for INS to “reap where it had not sown” and
enjoined INS from copying the underlying facts from AP news articles
31
“until its commercial value as news had passed away.” The Court
reasoned that a systemic pattern of indiscriminate free-riding by direct
competitors was intolerable because it would in effect “cut off the service
32
by rendering the cost prohibitive in comparison with the return.” The

24. See, e.g., Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Record Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950), aff’d,
107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
25. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (currently 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101–22 (2012)).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
27. Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 621, 627 (2003).
28. Id.
29. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 216 (1918).
30. Id. at 239. To “reap where one has not sown” is the foundation of a moral theory of
misappropriation that views free-riding pejoratively. But when it comes to copying, the Copyright Act
clearly tolerates some acts of free-riding that are useful to society, and this includes factual copying.
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). The moral theory of
misappropriation itself has been squarely rejected, and thus it is impossible to tell what free-riding is
moral or immoral except by reference to free-riding that is prohibited by law. See Fin. Info., Inc. v.
Moody’s Investors Servs., 808 F.2d 205, 208–09 (2d Cir. 1986).
31. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 232.
32. Id. at 241. For a critique of INS, see Posner, supra note 27, at 628 (challenging the Supreme
Court’s conclusion that INS’s free-riding threatened the continued vitality of AP’s business because
INS’s free-riding was limited in scope and in time: “INS was not paraphrasing all the AP’s dispatches,
just those concerning the war in Europe. And it was doing so not to save money but because it was
prevented by the British and French censors from reporting from the war zone. This was a special
situation . . . and [was] therefore unlikely to be a serious threat to the continued viability of AP.”).
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Court’s rationale laid the foundation for the Second Circuit’s three-part
NBA test some eighty years later.
After INS, the scope of the misappropriation doctrine took center
33
stage in the Second Circuit case Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp. In that
case, Doris Silk directly copied Cheney Brothers’ silk scarf design while
34
it was fashionable. Cheney Brothers brought an INS misappropriation
claim and requested an eight-month injunction that corresponded to the
35
length of time that a scarf design remained “hot” in the fashion world.
Judge Learned Hand disagreed: He was concerned that granting Cheney
Brothers an injunction would perpetuate a dual system of common-law
and federal copyrights where rights varied from state to state and
36
between federal and state court. Limiting INS to its facts, Judge Hand
stated:
[I]f [INS] meant to lay down a general doctrine, it would cover this
case . . . . We do not believe that it did. . . . [W]e think that no more was
covered than situations substantially similar to those then at bar . . . .
We are to suppose that the court meant to create a sort of common-law
patent or copyright for reasons of justice. Either would flagrantly
conflict with the scheme which Congress has for more than a century
37
devised to cover the subject-matter.

Judge Hand’s analysis emphasizes the importance of the uniform
application of federal copyright law across the United States. His
conclusions coincide with the broad preemptive scope of the 1976
38
Copyright Act. Judge Hand also voiced skepticism because Cheney
Brothers’ silk scarf designs, unlike factual information, were eligible for
39
copyright protection. A separate line of cases emerged after Cheney Bros.
that dealt primarily with content that was not protected by the 1909
Copyright Act.
In Metropolitan Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Record Corp.
(“Metropolitan Opera”), Metropolitan Opera brought a misappropriation
claim to enjoin Wagner-Nichols from making and selling copies of its live
40
opera radio broadcasts. The 1909 Copyright Act did not extend copyright
41
protection to live broadcasts because they failed the fixation requirement.

33. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
34. Id. at 279.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 280.
37. Id.
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
39. Cheney Bros., 35 F.2d at 279.
40. 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (1950).
41. Under the current Copyright Act, copyright extends to works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Live broadcasts, of course, are not fixed in a
tangible medium of expression, although recordings of those broadcasts are. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v.
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Still, the district court granted an injunction under the broad “principle
that property rights of commercial value are to be and will be protected
42
from any form of commercial immorality.” Metropolitan Opera’s
suggestion that misappropriation has a moral component is notable but
flawed. The suggestion is notable for hot news cases because free-riding,
the actus reus of hot news defendants, connotes wrongful (i.e., immoral)
copying. The suggestion is flawed because it confuses normative wrongs
with legal wrongs. Cases interpreting the 1976 Copyright Act have
overwhelmingly rejected a moral theory of misappropriation that is not
43
directly tethered to a legal wrong.
B. The 1976 Copyright Act
Passage of the 1976 Copyright Act caused a decline in
misappropriation claims and specifically hot news claims. There are two
notable aspects of the 1976 Amendments. First, Congress expanded the
types of copyrightable subject matter to protect several categories of
works that were previously ineligible for copyright protection, including
44
simultaneous broadcasts. Second, Congress included § 301, which is a
broad preemption provision that protects the uniform application of
federal copyright law: “[T]he federal legislative scheme . . . is best
understood as implying[] a jurisdictional purpose on the part of Congress
45
to occupy the field.” Section 301(a) states:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106
in works of authorship that . . . come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 . . . are governed
46
exclusively by this title.

Thus, § 301(a) contemplates a two-prong inquiry that compares a
state-created cause of action to the subject matter and the general scope

42. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071,
1099–101 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Metro.
Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950)). Under
a moral theory of misappropriation, a defendant can be liable solely on the basis of conduct that
appears immoral in the eyes of the court. Id. In INS, for example, the Supreme Court found INS’s
copying immoral because it enabled INS to reap where it had not sown, and thus to obtain an unfair
advantage of AP. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918). This theory of
liability has been replaced by a theory of liability that focuses on property rights—a defendant’s
copying is illegal if it infringes on the plaintiff’s legally enforceable right to the information and it is
illegal if the information is in the public domain. See Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc.
808 F.2d 204, 208–09 (2d Cir. 1986).
43. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Fin. Info., 808 F.2d 205.
44. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–02.
45. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1172–73 (3d ed. 1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (emphasis added).
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of the Copyright Act—that is, the rights protected by the Act. In a hot
news case, the central question under the subject matter prong is whether
time-sensitive factual information falls within the subject matter of
47
copyright even though that information is not copyrightable. Courts
have answered this question affirmatively: Facts do come within the
48
subject matter of copyright even though they are not copyrightable. The
central question under the general scope prong is whether the rights that
a hot news claim protects are equivalent to the rights afforded to
49
copyright holders. This Note answers this affirmatively: A hot news
misappropriation claim is only preempted if the answer to both of these
questions is yes.
The confusing legislative history behind § 301, which went through
some notable and controversial changes, is a primary reason that hot
news misappropriation claims have survived longer than other
misappropriation claims. On June 13, 1975, the Senate added an
illustrative list of claims that might survive preemption in appropriate
50
circumstances as § 301(b)(3). That list included “rights against
misappropriation” that were not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
51
specified in section 106 of the Copyright Act. This directly bears on
whether hot news claims are preempted, as the Senate Judiciary
Committee report accompanying the Copyright Act explains:
[S]tate law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy . . . against a
consistent pattern of unauthorized appropriation by a competitor of
the facts (i.e., not the literary expression) constituting “hot” news,
whether in the traditional mold of International News Service v.
Associated Press, or in the newer form of data updates from scientific,
52
business, or financial data bases.

The Senate Report expressly states that hot news claims survive
preemption. However, it is not clear why an INS-like claim would survive
preemption given that misappropriation “is a broad, common law
anticopying doctrine” that is inherently at odds with the Copyright Act’s
53
preemption provision. In any event, reliance on the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s report is misplaced because the report corresponds to a
portion of § 301 that was removed from the Copyright Act prior to
publication at the request of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).

47. See infra Part II.A.
48. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. 340; Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
49. See infra Part II.B.
50. See S. 22, 94th Cong. § 301, at 33 (1975).
51. Id.
52. S. Rep. No. 473, at 116 (1975) (citation omitted); see H.R. Rep. No. 1476, at 132 (1976).
53. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the
United States and Abroad, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151, 157 (1997).
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The DOJ opposed enumerating misappropriation in § 301(b)(3)
because it feared that the provision would allow state law claims that made
“actionable the mere unauthorized reproduction of a work” to survive
54
This, they claimed, would make the preemption
preemption.
55
meaningless. The DOJ’s fears were unfounded because the list of nonpreempted claims in § 301(b)(3) was explicitly subject to the preemption
standard set out in § 301(a). Thus, § 301(a) would not have been rendered
meaningless because it trumped the illustrative list in § 301(b)(3).
Regardless, Congress agreed with the DOJ and deleted the language in
§ 301(b)(3) that explicitly saved non-equivalent misappropriation claims
56
from preemption. But Congress inexplicably retained the Senate
Judiciary Committee’s suggestion that an INS-like misappropriation claim
might survive preemption. It republished that sentiment verbatim in the
House Judiciary Committee Report (“House Report”) that accompanied
57
the bill.
Judicial reliance on the House Report, though widespread, is
misplaced. Because the House Report refers to an earlier version of the
Copyright Act, scholars suggest that it “should not be taken as persuasive
58
evidence of Congress’s intent.” “[M]ore likely, those involved in
drafting the House Report simply did not carefully examine exactly why
59
International News-type claims should survive preemption.” Nimmer on
Copyright suggests that because the legislative history is ambiguous with
respect to misappropriation, courts ought to rely exclusively on the
60
language of the statute. William Patry argues that, in light of the
“refusal by some judges to rely on legislative report language, it is
insufficient to merely cite to report language if there is concern that
61
language is contrary to the statute.” However, in light of the Copyright
Act’s contradictory legislative history, courts failed to appreciate the full
preemptive scope of § 301 in hot news cases.

54. See William F. Patry, 6 Patry on Copyrights § 18:8 (2012). Patry goes on to explain that the
DOJ’s fears were likely unfounded based on the statutory language that incorporated limitations from
§ 301(a) into (b)(3). Id.
55. See 122 Cong. Rec. 32,015 (Sept. 22, 1976) (explaining why § 301 was amended to exclude the
misappropriation savings provision).
56. Id. Section 301(b)(3)’s use of the phrase “non-equivalent” expressly invokes § 301(a)’s
general scope prong. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (“[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . are governed exclusively by this
title.” (emphasis added)).
57. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, at 132.
58. Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 162 n.46.
59. Nicholas Khadder, National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 1998 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 3, 17.
60. See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.01[B][1][f][iv] (1997).
61. Patry, supra note 54, § 18:40.
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C. Courts Struggle to Interpret § 301 in Hot News Cases
Prior to NBA, there were two categories of hot news cases: those
that failed to acknowledge § 301, and those that failed to appreciate its
full preemptive scope. Standard & Poor’s Corp. v. Commodity Exchange,
62
Inc. is representative of the former category. In Standard & Poor’s,
Standard & Poor’s sued to prevent Commodity Exchange from copying
its weighted compilation of stocks (factual information) for use on
63
Commodity Exchange’s stock exchange. Standard & Poor’s pled several
causes of action at the district court level, including copyright
64
infringement and misappropriation. The district court granted a
65
preliminary injunction that was upheld on appeal to the Second Circuit.
However, the Second Circuit did not discuss § 301 and the obvious
66
preemption problems facing Standard & Poor’s misappropriation claim.
This is not an isolated omission. Several other courts have failed to
appreciate the broad preemptive scope of § 301 in the wake of the 1976
67
Act and erroneously upheld INS-like misappropriation claims.
However, certain courts gradually began to head in the right direction.
In Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Service (“FII”),
the Second Circuit held that § 301 preempted a misappropriation claim
that sought to enjoin the unauthorized copying of non-copyrightable
68
bond reports. However, the FII court reached the right result for the
wrong reason because it relied on the House Report to assess § 301’s
second prong. The court stated: “The legislative history attempts to
describe the forms of unfair competition which are ‘equivalent’ to rights
69
protected by federal copyright law and which are not . . . .” Thus, citing
the House Report, FII stated in dicta that hot news claims are “a branch
of the unfair competition doctrine not preempted by the Copyright
70
Act.” Although the court opined that hot news claims theoretically
survive preemption, it held that FII’s claim simply was not hot: “[T]o the
extent that Moody’s did copy from FII, the information it published

62. 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982).
63. Id. at 706.
64. Id. at 707.
65. Id. at 709–10.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Lynch, Jones, & Ryan, Inc. v. Standard & Poor’s, No. 117064/97, 1998 WL 574166
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 11, 1998); Bd. of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 98 Ill. 2d 109 (1983). But see U.S.
Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1041 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a misappropriation
claim for the use of a mathematical formula failed to make out a prima facie case for misappropriation
under New Jersey law, but also failing to discuss § 301’s preemptive effect on that claim).
68. 808 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1986).
69. Id. at 208.
70. Id. at 209.
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would have been at least ten days old.” Part II.C.1 explains why, even if
FII’s information had been hot, its claim is preempted by § 301.
FII, though imperfect, was a step in the right direction. The decision
successfully refuted the moral theory of misappropriation upon which
72
cases like Metropolitan Opera and INS relied. FII stands for the
commonly accepted proposition that the wrongfulness of a defendant’s
unauthorized copying depends on whether that copying violates the law,
73
not upon amorphous concepts of morality. “If, for example, the work is
in the public domain, then its use would not be wrongful. Likewise, if, as
here, the work is unprotected by federal law because of lack of
74
originality, then its use is neither unfair nor unjustified.”
Following FII, the Supreme Court paved the way for uniform hot
news preemption in a non-hot-news case, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
75
Telephone Service Co. In Feist, Rural Telephone compiled the names
76
and phone numbers of its subscribers into a phonebook. When Rural’s
competitor, Feist Publications, copied the names and phone numbers
from Rural’s phonebook and reproduced them in its own phonebook,
77
Rural sued for copyright infringement. The Court rejected Rural’s claim
because the information in the phonebook was not sufficiently original to
78
qualify for copyright protection. The Court stated that it “may seem
unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be used by
others without compensation. . . . [H]owever, this is not some unforeseen
by-product of a statutory scheme. It is, rather, the essence of copyright,
79
and a constitutional requirement.” This quotation suggests that facts fall
within the subject matter of the Copyright Act—even though they are
not copyright eligible—because the Copyright Act intentionally left
factual information in the public domain.
The Court also suggested that there is a constitutional right to
appropriate factual material that is embedded in the Intellectual Property
Clause, which extends to situations in which others have labored to
80
discover that material. Some argue that the Court “announced
constitutional principles that would invalidate an INS-type
misappropriation claim . . . even if it was Congress’s clear intention to

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id.
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 349 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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81

permit the states to extend such protection.” One commentator has gone
so far as to suggest that “because there is a constitutional right of
appropriation, there cannot be a state claim of misappropriation of such
82
material.” However, information providers have sought sui generis
83
legislation for factual compilations and databases. They argue that fact84
protecting legislation is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.
Constitutional arguments aside, the Feist Court’s statements about the
subject matter of copyright strengthen the subject matter analysis in NBA.

II. NBA v. MOTOROLA and the Extra Elements Test
NBA is the seminal hot news case. Its “extra elements” test has been
85
adopted in a majority of jurisdictions. The case involved an innovative
sports-facts application that Motorola developed to transmit real-time
86
information about NBA games to cellular phones. Motorola gathered
87
that information by collecting data from live NBA broadcasts. The
NBA filed a hot news claim alleging that Motorola unlawfully
misappropriated the underlying facts of NBA games without bearing the
88
expense of producing those games. Motorola raised federal preemption
89
as its defense.
The NBA decision provides an excellent vehicle to analyze both
parts of the § 301 two-prong test for preemption. This Part uses the lower
90
court’s opinion to explain why hot news claims meet the § 301 subject
matter requirement and uses the appellate court’s opinion to explain why
hot news claims meet the § 301 general scope requirement. A claim is
only preempted if it meets both prongs of § 301. Even though the subject
matter debate is now settled, satisfying the first prong of § 301(a) is
necessary to support an argument for uniform hot news preemption.

81. Patry, supra note 54, § 18:40.
82. Id.
83. H.R. Rep. No. 108-421, pt. 1, at 8 (2004).
84. Id. at 15.
85. See, e.g., Confold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 960 (7th Cir. 2006); Agora
Fin., LLC v. Samler, 725 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499 (D. Md. 2010); X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d
1102, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Fred
Wehrenberger Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 1999);
Scranton Times, L.P. v. Wilkes-Barre Publ’g Co., No. 3:08-cv-2135, 2009 WL 3100963, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 23, 2009).
86. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843–44 (2nd Cir. 1997).
87. Id. at 844.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 843.
90. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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A. Hot News Falls Within the Subject Matter of the Copyright Act
The first prong of § 301(a) requires courts to determine whether a
state law claim comes “within the subject matter of copyright as specified
91
by sections 102 and 103.” In other words, did the Copyright Act
legislate with respect to the subject matter allegedly misappropriated—
here the historical facts that occur during NBA basketball games? Before
NBA, it was not clear if facts fell within the subject matter of copyright
because facts themselves were ineligible for copyright protection.
In NBA, the district court held that the underlying facts of an NBA
basketball game—as opposed to the live broadcast of the game—did not
92
fall within the subject matter of copyright. Nimmer and Nimmer
support this theory, otherwise known as partial preemption. “[P]reemption may be avoided . . . . [because] the subject matter of
misappropriation falls outside copyright’s sphere to the extent that it
applies to facts per se, which are ineligible for statutory copyright
93
protection.” However, the partial preemption theory does not fully
comport with § 301.
Section 301 requires a comparison between the subject matter at
issue in a lawsuit and the subject matter contained in sections 102 and
103 of the Copyright Act. Sections 102 and 103 both describe material
94
that is eligible for copyright protection, and also material that is not
95
eligible for copyright protection. Thus, the mere fact that content is
ineligible for copyright protection does not mean that it falls outside the
subject matter defined in sections 102 and 103 of the Act. For example,
96
“compilations of facts are within the subject matter of copyright,” but
§ 103(b) limits the scope of the copyright to the material authored by the
copyright holder, which excludes any preexisting facts contained within
the work. Section 102(b) also excludes facts from copyright protection:
“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship

91. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
92. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 939 F. Supp. at 1088.
93. Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 60, § 1.01[B][2][a].
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship . . . .
Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including
any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.”); see also id. § 103(a) (“The
subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works.”).
95. See id. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”
(emphasis added)); see also id. § 103(b) (“The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends
only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.”).
96. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).

Korr_19 (S. Alessi & M. STEVENS) (Do Not Delete)

June 2013]

7/15/2013 5:57 PM

THE CASE FOR UNIFORM HOT NEWS PREEMPTION

1535

97

extend to any idea . . . or discovery . . . .” According to Feist, facts are
just such a discovery: “The first person to find and report a particular fact
98
has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.”
Thus, while facts are not copyrightable, they easily fall within the subject
matter of copyright as § 301 defines the term. But the district court in
99
NBA held otherwise.
When Motorola appealed the district court’s ruling in NBA, the
Second Circuit rejected the district court’s reliance on a partial preemption
100
theory. It held that the underlying facts of NBA games did meet the
101
§ 301 subject matter requirement. The court stated: “Copyrightable
material often contains uncopyrightable elements within it, but Section
301 preemption bars state law misappropriation claims with respect to
102
uncopyrightable as well as copyrightable elements.” The court also
noted that partial preemption does not fit with § 301’s underlying policy in
favor of uniformity because “a partial preemption doctrine—preemption
of claims based on misappropriation of broadcasts but no preemption of
claims based on misappropriation of underlying facts—would expand
significantly the reach of state law claims and render the preemption
103
intended by Congress unworkable.” Thus, the Second Circuit rejected
the district court’s analysis of the § 301 subject matter requirement.
Once the court concluded that the NBA’s misappropriation claim fell
within the subject matter of copyright, it necessarily proceeded to analyze
104
§ 301’s second prong, the general scope requirement. Based on the facts
in evidence, the Second Circuit held that the NBA’s hot news claim was
105
preempted because it fell within the general scope of copyright. But the
court went on to suggest that if a hot news claim contained certain “extra
elements,” it would not meet the § 301 general scope prong and would
106
thus survive preemption. The Second Circuit’s extra elements test
fundamentally misconceives the general scope inquiry.
B. The General Scope Requirement: Testing Equivalency
The second prong of the § 301 preemption analysis is the general
scope requirement. The general scope requirement is met if a statecreated claim vindicates “rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 356 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
Id. at 347.
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 849.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 849–50.
Id. at 854.
Id. at 853.
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rights within the general scope” of section 106 of the Copyright Act.
The key to the general scope requirement is equivalency: Courts must
108
determine if the plaintiff’s claim vindicates rights that are equivalent to
the rights afforded by section 106 of the Copyright Act. Section 106
provides authors the exclusive right, among other things, to reproduce
and distribute copies of a copyrighted work and to prepare derivative
109
works based upon the copyrighted work.
Many courts employ an “extra elements” test to determine whether
a state-created cause of action, hot news or otherwise, falls outside of the
110
general scope of the Copyright Act. This test only comports with § 301
if those extra elements address the concept of equivalency. But some
extra elements merely limit “the scope of the claim but leave[] its
111
fundamental nature unaltered.” These claims are preempted if the state
right is violated by an act that would, by itself, also violate one of the
112
§ 106 rights. Thus, “unfair competition, misappropriation, or unjust
enrichment claims are preempted when based on alleged acts such as
113
distribution or reproduction.” Even if an element alters the scope of a
state claim (by, for example, narrowing the pool of eligible plaintiffs), the
claim remains equivalent to rights vindicated in § 106. Thus, scholars
suggest a more precise test that asks whether the extra elements create a
claim that is qualitatively different from—and thus not equivalent to—a
114
copyright infringement claim.
Conversion is a simple example of a state-created cause of action
that vindicates rights that are qualitatively different from the rights
protected by the Copyright Act. In a conversion action, the plaintiff sues
to recover a physical object that she owns and that the defendant
possesses. Consider a manuscript, a work clearly within the subject
115
matter of the Copyright Act. If an author’s only copy of her new
manuscript is stolen, the author’s only recourse is to sue under a
conversion theory and have her physical manuscript returned. Section
106 of the Copyright Act affords the plaintiff no relief. This hypothetical

107. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 106.
110. See, e.g., Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating
that elements altering the “action’s scope but not its nature” are insufficient to avoid preemption); Mayer
v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
111. Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306.
112. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992).
113. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 909 (2011) (Raggi, J.,
concurring). See Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306 (stating that the “enrichment element,” like intent or
awareness, limited the claim’s scope but left its “fundamental nature unaltered”).
114. See, e.g., Patry, supra note 54, §§ 18:18–19.
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
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conversion claim is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim because it vindicates the author’s exclusive right to possess the
physical manuscript—but not her exclusive right to copy the manuscript
or make derivative use of it. Therefore, the conversion claim falls outside
of the general scope of copyright and is not preempted. Other nonpreempted claims include reverse palming-off, breach of fiduciary
116
relationship, and trade secrets.
C. Hot News Claims Fall Within the General Scope of the
Copyright Act
In NBA, the Second Circuit described three extra elements that
117
purportedly save a hot news claim from preemption. Those elements
are “(i) the time-sensitive value of factual information, (ii) the free-riding
by a defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence of the product or
118
service provided by the plaintiff.” The NBA opinion failed to explain
how any of these elements are qualitatively different from a claim based
on the unauthorized reproduction of factual material. Instead, the court
erroneously relied on the House Report’s suggestion that hot news
119
claims survive preemption. The court pole-vaulted this essential part of
a § 301 inquiry because of the court’s reliance on the House Report. This
presupposed that a hot news claim should survive preemption, and the
court then tried to articulate a test that fit that result as opposed to a test
that fit the statute.
The court also failed to explain why all three of these elements are
necessary. Logically, if any one of the elements were qualitatively different
from rights vindicated by § 106, the claim falls outside of the scope of the
Copyright Act and the presence of other elements is superfluous. Since the
court did not analyze whether its extra elements were equivalent to the
rights provided in § 106, it is necessary to reconstruct that inquiry in order
to see if NBA identified any element that should allow a hot news claim to
survive preemption.
In addition to the three extra elements quoted above, the NBA
court suggested that two other elements are essential to a hot news claim:

116. These claims all contain elements that infringe rights that are qualitatively different than
those in Copyright Act § 106. For example, reverse palming-off requires affirmative acts that deceive
consumers about the source of an item. None of the exclusive rights in § 106 protect against source
confusion. Trade secret claims and breach of fiduciary duty claims both involve the breach of a
confidential relationship. The Copyright Act does not regulate special relationships between parties.
For an extensive treatment of the subject, see Patry, supra note 54, §§ 18:20–47.
117. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997).
118. Id. Applying these elements to the case at bar, the NBA court held that the NBA’s hot news
claim was preempted because Motorola expended its own resources to collect factual data about NBA
games and thus was not free-riding. Id. at 854.
119. See supra Part I.B.
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(1) The “plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost,” and
(2) “the defendant is in direct competition with a product or service
120
offered by the plaintiffs.” Some courts have adopted NBA in a five-part
121
formulation that incorporates these two extra elements. The following
Subparts analyze all five elements in turn to see if they create a cause of
action that is qualitatively different from, and thus not equivalent to, the
rights protected by section 106 of the Copyright Act. In my view, the five
extra elements merely limit the scope of a claim based on unauthorized
reproduction, but fail to alter the fundamental nature of that claim. Thus,
the Copyright Act should preempt a hot news claim in all circumstances.
1.

The Time-Sensitive Value of Factual Information

The time-sensitive value of factual information is an element that
narrows the pool of potentially viable infringement actions but does not
122
alter their fundamental nature. This element reduces the universe of
potential claims from the unauthorized reproduction of factual material
123
to the unauthorized reproduction of hot facts. In either case, the nature
of the claim involves the unauthorized reproduction of facts. Since
reproduction is one of the rights enumerated in § 106, narrowing the pool
of unauthorized reproduction claims does not save hot news from
preemption. The time-sensitive element might also narrow the scope of
the remedy to the amount of time that the factual information is “hot.”
However, tinkering with the scope of a remedy is not enough to save a
124
state-created cause of action from preemption.
Furthermore, the Copyright Act already vindicates an author’s right
to exploit the time-sensitive value of a copyright because § 106 protects
an author’s exclusive right to “distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted
125
work to the public.” For example, in Harper & Row Publishing, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court found copyright infringement
when The Nation “broke” bits of Gerald Ford’s memoirs to the public
126
before his licensee, Time Magazine, had released the same material. At
the time, President Ford’s memoirs were unreleased and they contained

120. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 845.
121. See, e.g., Confold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 960–62 (7th Cir. 2006).
122. Cf. Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir. 2004).
123. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 163 (arguing that the time-sensitive value of factual
information puts it outside the scope of copyright because “the feature of the work for which the
claimant is seeking protection—its time sensitivity—is irrelevant to copyrightability”). Ginsburg’s
argument is flawed because it relies on a modified partial preemption theory—that some features of
the work are within the subject matter of copyright, but the valuable features of the work are not. Id.
124. See Patry, supra note 54, § 18:19.
125. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
126. 471 U.S. at 539, 569 (1985).
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127

time-sensitive factual information of great public interest. The Court
held that The Nation infringed section 106 of the Copyright Act when it
copied parts of Ford’s Memoirs and incorporated them into a derivative
128
work. Despite the quasi-factual nature of President Ford’s autobiography,
the Supreme Court granted it “thick” copyright protection in order to
129
protect the right of first release. Thus, Harper & Row supports the
proposition that section 106 of the Copyright Act vindicates the right to
exploit the time-sensitive value of factual material that is part of a larger
copyrightable work.
On a practical note, if the time-sensitive value of factual information
made a misappropriation claim qualitatively different from a copyright
claim, § 301 would be reduced to absurdity because all valuable copyrights
would fall outside the scope of copyright for however long they were
“hot.”
2.

Free-Riding by a Defendant

Free-riding is the heart of a hot news claim because it defines the
actus reus of the defendant’s allegedly tortious appropriation. There are
two elements embedded within free-riding: the act of free-riding, and a
connotation that free-riding is wrong. Neither element vindicates a right
that is different from the exclusive reproduction rights enshrined in
section 106 of the Copyright Act.
First, the act of free-riding falls within the general scope of
copyright. The Copyright Act’s primary purpose is to protect against
unlawful copying. As Jane Ginsburg explains, free-riding “may be a
130
pejorative description of copying, but it is still copying.” In hot news
cases, the actus reus side of free-riding occurs when the defendant copies
the plaintiff’s hot facts. For example, in INS, INS copied the facts
131
underlying AP’s news stories, in NBA, Motorola copied the facts
132
underlying NBA basketball games, and in Barclays, Theflyonthewall.com
133
copied the facts underlying Barclay’s financial reports.
Second, the normative description of free-riding as wrongful
harkens back to a moral—or a sweat-of-the-brow—theory of copyright.
Those respective theories have been rejected by the Second Circuit and
the Supreme Court. The fact that a defendant might receive a
competitive—and perhaps monetary—windfall because it used facts that

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 162.
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 231 (1918).
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843–44 (2d Cir. 1997).
Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 2011).
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another company uncovered through significant investment does not
make a hot news claim qualitatively different from a copyright claim. As
the Supreme Court noted, though the defendant’s windfall may seem
unfair, “this is not some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme. It
134
is, rather, the essence of copyright, and a constitutional requirement.”
In other words, the unfair or immoral aspects of free-riding are
contemplated in the Copyright Act.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit rejected any reliance on the
amorphous concepts of morality unless morality is directly tethered to a
legal wrong. “Whether or not reproduction of another’s work is
‘immoral’ depends on whether such use of the work is wrongful. If, for
example, the work is in the public domain, then its use would not be
135
wrongful.” Thus, the second characteristic of free-riding, its immoral
connotation, does not put a hot news misappropriation claim outside the
general scope of copyright.
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition suggests that an
INS-like misappropriation claim survives preemption because a
systematic pattern of free-riding falls outside the general scope of
136
copyright. The drafters of the Restatement are incorrect. A systematic
pattern of free-riding, much like the time-sensitive value of factual
information, is an element that alters the scope of a misappropriation
claim without altering its nature. The scope of the claim is narrowed from
all instances of copying to cases of systematic copying, but the nature of
the claim is still unauthorized copying. The drafters erred because
section 106 of the Copyright Act gives authors exclusive rights to prevent
unauthorized copying whether that copying is done once or on a
systematic basis. Since the Copyright Act already protects against
systematic copying, a claim based on systematic copying is equivalent to
a copyright infringement claim. However, Judge Richard Posner suggests
that a systematic pattern of free-riding allows a hot news claim to survive
preemption where that systematic pattern threatens the very existence of
137
the industry in question.

134. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 1986).
136. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 38 cmt. c (1997). Note that despite its halfhearted argument that hot news claims survive § 301 preemption, the restatement disfavors the
misappropriation doctrine generally because of its tendency to stifle competition. Id.
137. See generally Posner, supra note 27.
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Threat to the Very Existence of the Product or Service

The threat to the very existence of a product or service is a concept
138
drawn directly from INS. “If services like AP were not assured of
property rights in the news they pay to collect, . . . [t]he newspaperreading public would suffer because no one would have an incentive to
139
collect ‘hot news.’” Judge Posner suggests that this is the key element
140
that allows hot news claims to survive preemption. He has argued that
if unauthorized copying is going to “kill the goose that laid the golden
141
eggs,” then state efforts to protect the goose are not preempted. Judge
Posner is incorrect.
There are two reasons why the threat to the very existence of a
product or service, as an element, does not vindicate rights that are
different in kind from section 106 of the Copyright Act. First, the threat
to the existence of an industry is simply not an act, but is instead the
142
result of an act. The act is copying and § 106 vindicates the right to
prevent copying. Second, Congress contemplated the incentive structures
required to produce copyrightable subject matter when it passed the
143
Copyright Act. Feist suggests that Congress decided not to protect
144
certain types of works and, by extension, Feist suggests a legislative
intent not to protect the industries that invest in producing those works.
The threat to the very existence of a product or service, as an element,
does not fundamentally differ from the constitutionally recognized idea
that incentive is necessary to promote authorship. Section 106 embodies
the exclusive rights that incentivize authors. Thus, NBA’s third and final
element does not vindicate rights that are qualitatively different than
those contained in § 106.
To summarize, NBA defined three extra elements that save a hot
news claim from preemption: (i) the time-sensitive value of factual
information; (ii) free-riding by a defendant; and (iii) the threat to the
145
very existence of the product or service. None of these three elements
create a state-law cause of action that is qualitatively different from, and
thus not equivalent to, section 106 of the Copyright Act.

138. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235 (1918).
139. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997).
140. See generally Posner, supra note 27.
141. See id. at 628.
142. See Khadder, supra note 59, at 17; see also Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc.,
650 F.3d 876, 906–07 (2d Cir. 2011) (Raggi, J., concurring).
143. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings . . . .”).
144. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
145. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997).
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NBA’s Alternative Five-Part Test
146

NBA also discussed a five-part test for hot news preemption. The
five-part test adds two elements to the three elements discussed above:
(iv) the plaintiff gathers information at some cost; and (v) the parties are in
147
direct competition. Although some circuits have adopted NBA’s five148
part test, the two additional elements fail to save a hot news claim from
preemption. First, the element that a plaintiff gathers information at
some cost merely narrows the pool of potential plaintiffs to those who
have expended resources to gather facts. The gravamen of the claim is
still copying. The investment of time and resources is in no way unique to
a hot news claim; it is a common element in most garden-variety copyright
149
infringement claims. In any event, the Supreme Court rejected sweat of
150
the brow as a stand-alone basis for intellectual property in Feist.
The element of direct competition between the parties also merely
narrows the pool of eligible plaintiffs without altering the fundamental
nature of the claim. Direct competition may have been included because it
provides evidence that the defendant’s free-riding actually will threaten
the existence of the plaintiff’s industry or service. While direct competition
may be an essential element of a hot news claim as a tort, it is not an
element that makes the claim qualitatively different from a copyright
claim.
5.

Summary

The NBA court fundamentally misconceived of the extra elements
inquiry because it did not link the extra elements test to the equivalency
language of § 301. Extra elements are only useful when they reveal
whether a state-created cause of action is truly protecting rights that are
different in kind from the Copyright Act. If so, then the state claim is not
equivalent to § 106 and is not preempted. When applied to the five
elements mentioned in NBA, none of these elements save hot news
151
claims from preemption. Thus, NBA’s suggestion that a properly
narrow hot news claim survives preemption is misguided. Hot news
claims should be preempted by the Copyright Act in all circumstances.

146. Id.
147. Id. at 845.
148. See, e.g., Confold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 962 (7th Cir. 2006).
149. See Patry, supra note 54, § 18:40 (“[I]t will always require some cost or expense to gather
material.”). If this element were qualitatively different, any state-law cause of action in which a
plaintiff expended resources would avoid preemption per se.
150. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991).
151. Even a claim that is narrowed to the facts of INS is preempted by § 301.

Korr_19 (S. Alessi & M. STEVENS) (Do Not Delete)

June 2013]

7/15/2013 5:57 PM

THE CASE FOR UNIFORM HOT NEWS PREEMPTION

1543

III. The Case for Uniform Hot News Preemption
Following NBA, courts around the country adopted its test as the
152
touchstone for hot news preemption. However, the vast majority of these
cases held that the plaintiff’s hot news claim was preempted. One might
conclude that the current hot news doctrine, while flawed, does little harm.
But allowing hot news claims to survive in a weakened form is far from
innocuous. Two recent cases help illustrate the logical and practical
problems that hot news claims raise. Furthermore, if hot news claims were
viable, this would cause significant policy problems. Therefore, courts
ought to discard what vestiges of the hot news doctrine remain in favor of
uniform hot news preemption. Although it perpetuated some of NBA’s
logical fallacies, Barclays was a step in the right direction because it
classified NBA’s three- and five-part tests as dicta.
A. BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC. V. THEFLYONTHEWALL.COM
The Second Circuit stepped back onto the center stage of hot news
153
with its recent opinion in Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com.
In Barclays, several financial service firms (the “Firms”) brought a hot
news claim against an online news aggregator (“Fly”) that reported the
Firms’ daily stock recommendations while those recommendations were
154
still “hot.” These recommendations, which were distributed to a limited
pool of major investors, were valuable because they were not generally
155
known. The Firms generated commissions by using their recommendation
156
services to persuade major investors to buy and sell stocks.
Fly was a financial news aggregator that did not offer the financial
157
services or otherwise compete with the Firms. Rather, it distributed
financial information to its subscribers in exchange for subscription and
158
ad revenue. Fly obtained the Firms’ financial recommendations from
major investors and then reported those recommendations on its
159
website. After a three-day bench trial, the district court granted
judgment in favor of the Firms on their hot news claim and enjoined Fly

152. See, e.g., Confold Pac., 433 F.3d at 960; Agora Fin., L.L.C. v. Samler, 725 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499
(D. Md. 2010); X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Pollstar v.
Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Fred Wehrenberger Circuit of Theatres, Inc.
v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 1999); Scranton Times, L.P. v. Wilkes-Barre
Publ’g Co., No. 3:08-cv-2135, 2009 WL 3100963, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2009).
153. 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
154. Id. at 880–82.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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from reporting the Firms’ recommendations “for a period ranging from
160
thirty minutes to several hours after they are released by the plaintiffs.”
The Second Circuit reversed. There are three key elements to its
decision. First, the court held that the Firms’ hot news claim was
preempted because there was no evidence that Fly was free-riding off of
161
the Firms’ efforts. Just as Motorola was not free-riding off of NBA’s
products because it collected the facts of NBA games itself, Fly was not
free-riding because it collected the facts underlying the Firms’ reports
162
itself. The court distinguished Fly’s actions from the facts in INS
163
because INS did not expend its own resources to collect the facts.
Second, the court looked to INS for a more nuanced definition of
free-riding: “[T]he term free-riding refers explicitly to a requirement for
a cause of action as described by INS. . . . as ‘taking material that has
been acquired by complainant . . . [through] the expenditure of labor,
skill, and money, and . . . appropriating it and selling it as [the
164
defendant’s] own. . . .’” The court used this definition from the INS in
two ways. First, it distinguished between plaintiffs who expend effort to
165
collect facts from plaintiffs who expend effort to create facts. For
example, the AP collected the facts of World War I, whereas the NBA
created facts by putting on basketball games, and the Firms created facts
by announcing their daily stock recommendations. The Barclays court
declared that a defendant free-rides in the INS sense when it
appropriates facts that the plaintiff collected, but not facts that the
166
plaintiff created. Thus, the court concluded that Fly did not take an
167
INS-like free-ride off of the Firms’ financial reports.
The court also used the INS definition of free-riding to suggest that
168
there is a reverse palming-off component to free-riding. The court
concluded that because Fly attributed financial recommendations to the
financial firms, it was not free-riding. But if Fly had claimed the
169
recommendations were its own, it would have been free-riding. Here
the court misreads INS. Reverse palming-off is a separate doctrine from
hot news misappropriation. In fact, Justice Holmes dissented from INS
because he would have decided the case on reverse palming-off grounds,

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 887.
Id. at 878.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 903 (final two alterations in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 907.
Id.
Id.
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170

as opposed to creating a quasi-property right in the news. Reverse
palming-off is likely not preempted by the Copyright Act because that
tort is based on source confusion, a concept that falls outside the general
171
If Fly held out the Firms’ financial
scope of copyright.
recommendations as its own, the Firms would have a non-preempted
reverse palming-off claim. To the extent Barclays reads reverse palmingoff into the elements of a hot news claim, it conflates its tort theories.
The third and most important feature of Barclays is that it classified
172
the NBA hot news test as dicta. The court stated: “We think that the
NBA panel’s decision that the absence of ‘free riding’ was fatal to the
plaintiff’s claim in that case is binding upon us on the facts presented
here,” explaining that the “NBA panel decided the case before it, and we
think that the law it thus made regarding ‘hot news’ preemption is, as we
have tried to explain, determinative here. But the Court’s various
173
explanations of its five-part approach are not.”
Thus, the court construed NBA’s hot news test as dicta, but
suggested without explanation that a properly narrow hot news claim
174
survives preemption. It is just not clear why. For example, if Motorola
had copied the scores of contemporaneous basketball games from an
NBA-owned sports statistics application, would that claim survive
preemption because Motorola was free-riding? I suggest that the claim
ought to be preempted based on my previous conclusion that free-riding
175
never saves a claim from preemption. However, Barclays supports the
opposite result. Here, Barclays obfuscates more than it clarifies.
Equivocal precedent is inefficient for parties who may litigate through
trial and appeal and is a waste of the trial court’s time because the court
will almost certainly find preemption but cannot dismiss the claim
outright.
B. ASSOCIATED PRESS V. ALL HEADLINE NEWS
The problems of a dormant hot news doctrine become more acute
when a well-heeled plaintiff seeks to stifle competition by using litigation

170. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246–48 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
171. For a full discussion of why reverse palming-off is not preempted by the Copyright Act, see
Patry, supra note 54, §§ 18:20–47.
172. The court also suggested that a three-part iteration of the NBA test is dicta. See Barclays
Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 899 n.32 (“[The court’s] language regarding
the elements that might in some later case allow a claim to avoid preemption, and its discussion of why
such an exception to preemption was narrow, were useful commentaries on the reasoning and possible
implications of the Court’s holding. But the language itself was not meant to, and did not, bind us, the
district court, or any other court to subsequently consider this subject.”).
173. Id. at 906–07, 899.
174. Id. at 898.
175. See supra Part II.C.2.
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to crush a small competitor who may not be able to fund a case past
summary judgment. In Associated Press v. All Headline News Co. (“AP
v. AHN”), AP brought a hot news claim against All Headline News Co.
(“AHN”) because it allegedly hired “‘poorly paid individuals’ to find
news stories on the internet and prepare them for republication under
176
the AHN banner.” AHN moved to dismiss, but instead of attacking the
elements of the hot news claim directly, AHN argued that that Florida
law governed the case and that Florida did not recognize a hot news
177
cause of action. The district court disagreed and, after dispatching with
AHN’s defense to the hot news cause of action in one sentence, denied
178
its motion to dismiss. Following the court’s order, the parties settled
179
the case and AHN agreed to pay AP an undisclosed amount.
There are a few takeaways from AP v. AHN. First, deep-pocketed
plaintiffs like AP can use the hot news cause of action in its current
weakened form to attack small competitors who use facts that are in the
public domain. Trial courts that follow Barclays and NBA are stuck with
the proposition that hot news claims survive preemption if pled correctly.
Thus, lower courts will have to retain hot news claims through pre-trial
motions if they are pled accurately and plausibly. Second, small
companies that appropriate facts and republish those facts are ill situated
to defend hot news claims. AHN, for example, failed to make a
compelling attack on the elements of AP’s hot news claim and also
settled its case without even proceeding to summary judgment.
Third, a case like AP v. AHN, while non-binding, provides more
leverage to companies like AP. After the Barclays decision was
published, AP issued a press release that stated: “The Court contrasted
[its] facts with a ‘hot news’ complaint that AP had previously brought
against a media company alleged to have copied AP-gathered news and
to have published that news as its own, in competition with AP’s
180
services.” AP was, of course, referring to AP v. AHN. Its press release
stated further: “Such a case, the Court said, was likely a viable ‘hot news’
181
claim that would not be preempted by the Copyright Act.” However,

176. 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Note that Barclays probably cited AP v. AHN
because, under the Barclays definition of free-riding, AHN’s actions would not be preempted by the
Copyright Act. AHN allegedly copied the facts that AP had collected and republished them as its own.
Barclays, 650 F.3d at 906.
177. All Headline News, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
178. Id. at 461.
179. See Elinor Mills, AP, AHN Media Settle Intellectual Property Lawsuit, CNET (July 13, 2009,
6:11 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10285827-93.html.
180. Press Release, Associated Press, AP’s Statement on Barclays Capital Inc. v.
Theflyonthewall.com, Inc. (June 20, 2011), available at http://www.noodls.com/viewNoodl/10443878/
apf---the-associated-press/aps-statement-on-barclays-capital-inc-v-theflyonthewallc.
181. Id.; see AP and AHN Media Settle AP’s Lawsuit Against AHN Media and Individual
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under a proper § 301 analysis, AP’s claim against AHN should be
preempted by the Copyright Act. Unfortunately, small parties do not
have the resources to find out and often must settle their cases in the
shadow of the law. Thus, AP v. AHN illustrates that hot news
misappropriation claims stifle competition by limiting the competitive
use of the public domain.
C. A Viable Hot News Doctrine Would Cause Significant
Problems
In its current form, the hot news doctrine articulated in NBA and
clarified in Barclays poses two problems: It is both inefficient and
anticompetitive. If hot news claims became more widespread or more
successful, the doctrine would stifle free access to facts, threaten the
uniform application of national laws, and prove difficult for judges to
administer.
The hot news doctrine is inefficient, particularly after Barclays,
because it does not offer a coherent view of a non-preempted hot news
claim. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that hot news claims are not
universally preempted, how should a lower court apply the BarclaysNBA line of cases? Those cases suggest that (1) a theoretical hot news
claim survives preemption, but (2) a claim is preempted if the defendant
did not take a free ride, and (3) the three-part NBA test is not
controlling. However, what should a lower court do if it reviews a case of
clear free-riding but only some of the NBA elements are met? Barclays
and NBA do not provide a clear answer. This is partly because of
inherent logical problems in those opinions, but also because both cases
found the hot news claim was preempted. Barclays and NBA’s
preemption holdings are consistent with almost every other hot news
case since the passage of the Copyright Act. Since courts find preemption
182
in almost every hot news case, universal preemption would allow courts
to reach the same result more efficiently, while conserving the parties’
resources.
A viable hot news doctrine is anticompetitive and has very limited
183
utility. AP v. AHN illustrates the problem of deep-pocketed plaintiffs
184
leveraging litigation against small competitors. If hot news litigation
succeeds, those plaintiffs will stifle free access to facts by silencing
sources that widely disseminate those facts with little public benefit.
Defendants, Associated Press (July 13, 2009), http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-in-the-News/Archive/
AP-AHN-Settle-Lawsuit.
182. The very few cases that rule in favor of a hot news plaintiff are, as this Note has argued, in
error.
183. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, supra note 136.
184. See supra Part III.B.
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Although the newspaper industry is shrinking faster than any other
185
industry in the United States, the primary cause is not hot news
misappropriation. Rather, the public’s news consumption has changed.
While newspaper circulation and ad revenue have decreased significantly
186
over the past decade, digital ad revenue has not filled the void.
Revenue from classified ads, once a major source of newspaper revenue,
187
has eroded given the rise of websites like craigslist.com. Further, while
newspapers once had geographic monopolies over local readers, the
Internet now allows consumers to access a wider variety of news sources
188
for their national and world news. Therefore the hot news doctrine
would not mitigate the real problems facing the newspaper industry and
would not ensure that the public has broader access to high quality facts.
But the doctrine would encroach on the public domain and stifle
competition. That encroachment is not warranted unless it is justified by
a tangible public benefit.
A viable hot news doctrine would also be difficult to administer and
potentially unpredictable. First, courts are ill-equipped to make
inherently legislative judgments about which industries deserve hot news
189
protection. Furthermore, how is a court contemplating a hot news
injunction supposed to determine the exact length of time news remains
hot? To the extent that circuits might reach different interpretations, the
scope of the rights in factual material would be difficult to predict.
Consider that most news is distributed online to a national audience. If
the scope of rights varied from state to state, online news distributors
might have to abide by the laws of the most restrictive state. When taken
together, the problems inherent in a viable hot news doctrine illustrate
Judge Posner’s point: “Misappropriation doctrine . . . is alarmingly fuzzy
once the extreme position of creating a legal right against all free riding
190
is rejected.” By contrast, section 301 of the Copyright Act was created
to ensure the uniform application of copyright law, which contemplates

185. Christopher Zara, Newspaper Industry Shrinks 40 Percent in a Decade: Report, Int’l Bus.
Times (Sept. 20, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/newspaper-industry-shrinks-40-percentdecade-report-793706.
186. John Barth, How Newspapers Can Survive, CNN (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2012/03/20/opinion/barth-newspapers-decline.
187. Jonathan Bailey, Why Newspapers Are Struggling, Plagiarism Today (June 4, 2012),
http://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2012/06/04/why-newspapers-are-struggling.
188. Id.
189. Compare Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) (declining to
extend INS to cover “hot” scarf designs), with Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950) (extending misappropriation protection to “hot” opera
broadcasts).
190. Posner, supra note 27, at 638.
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the distribution of facts. It was specifically designed to prevent a
patchwork of state regulations.

Conclusion
The touchstone of the hot news preemption analysis is the § 301
two-prong preemption test. In all cases, a hot news claim falls within the
subject matter of the Copyright Act because these claims concern factual
information. For a hot news claim to survive preemption then, the court
must determine whether it contains extra elements that are qualitatively
different from a copyright claim. In other words, the court must find
extra elements that vindicate rights that are different from the rights
protected by section 106 of the Copyright Act. But, as this Note has
argued, there are no extra elements that place hot news claims outside of
the general scope of copyright. Thus, even if a district court were
confronted with the exact facts from INS, a logical general scope inquiry
inevitably leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not identified a
cause of action that falls outside the general scope of the Copyright Act.
Properly understood, § 301’s two-prong inquiry takes precedence over
dicta from the Second Circuit and § 301’s convoluted legislative history.
A forward-thinking court of appeals should reject the dicta in Barclays
and NBA in favor of a clear statement that the Copyright Act uniformly
preempts hot news misappropriation claims. Uniform preemption is
supported by the legal system’s strong preference for judicial efficiency,
free-market competition, and public access to factual information.

